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Discrimination in the jury system has been a matter of 
constitutional and ethical concern at least since the 
mid-n ineteenth century. Ethnic and l inguistic minori­
ties have been disadvantaged by the use of the 
peremptory chal lenge, statutory requirements, and 
administrative practices which compromised the Sixth 
Amendment provision for a jury of one's peers with its 
impl ication for juror impartial ity. Attacks on the dis­
criminatory applications of those systems and prac­
tices resu lted in reduction, as gradual as it was, of the 
exclusionary practices. Batson vs Kentucky made the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee more reachable for eth­
nic and l ingu istic minorities . 
The campaign to el iminate ethnic bias from the jury system and 
to make panels conform more closely to the ideal of trial by a 
jury of one's peers has been long and tortuous. As with much 
of the legal system the enti re system of trial by ju ry is often 
manipu lated to discriminate against members of cognizable 
groups including ethnic and l inguistic m inorities. That manipu­
lation of the system occurs is not surprising.  The selection 
process, the wider judicial system and its traditions , and the 
plural istic nature of the American nation lend themselves to it. 
The United States Department of Justice counted n inety-two 
different methods to select jurors in the federal system. 1 When 
the vast panoply of state and local courts are added to the fed­
eral system the variety becomes almost unfathomable. 
Trial by jury is rooted in law and tradition . It is widely 
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accepted that the practice existed in England by the end of the 
thirteenth century. Engl ish settlers took it to the colonies in the 
early seventeenth century. Colonial practices concern ing 
juries and trial procedures were enshrined in the Fifth , Sixth , 
and Seventh amendments of the United States Constitution 
after the Revolution. The Sixth guarantees the right to a trial by 
jury with the provision that "In al l  crim inal p rosecutions, the 
accused shal l  enjoy the right to a speedy and publ ic tria l ,  by an 
impartial jury of State and district wherein the crime shal l  have 
been committed . . . .  " The Constitution leaves the operation of 
state and local cou rts , including aspects of forming juries, to 
the states for non-federal matters hence the g reat variety of 
jury practices at the state and local levels. 
Some uniformity exists in  the jury selection p rocess 
nonetheless . In most ju risdictions there are three major phas­
es to the process. Fi rst there is identification of a qual ified 
pool . Membersh ip is obtained from l ists of payers of property 
taxes,  registered voters , holders of val id d river l icenses , names 
contributed by community leaders , telephone subscribers ,  or 
from some other  repository taken to be representative of the 
publ ic at large. Creation of the venire is the second step.  
Some members of the pool identified in  phase one are sum­
moned for a specific trial . Some jurisdictions permit ven i remen,  
those cal led for  phase two, to disqual ify themselves on pre­
senting of a val id  excuse. Physical condition ,  occupation ,  and 
employment are but three of the acceptable myriad of val id 
excuses. The last step is the voir dire. Voir dire means l i teral­
Iy "to see to tel l ." In it potential ju rors taken from the venire are 
subjected to oral question ing  by the judge, by attorneys to the 
suit , or by al l  of them . During the voir dire or at its end the 
venire pool is  cu l led to p rovide the actual trial jury and alter­
nates if the ju risdiction p rovides for alternates. 
The reduction of the venire to produce the tr ial ju ry is 
achieved mainly through a system of chal lenges and addition­
al disqual if ications. There are two types of chal lenges: cause 
and peremptory. A chal lenge for cause may be i nvoked when­
ever a member of the venire indicates or demonstrates some 
actual or potential partial ity to the case. Each side of a case 
can use an un l im ited number  of cha l lenges for cause. 
Peremptory chal lenges on the other hand are l im ited .  The 
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number is establ ished by the pol i tical  o r  j udic ial  j u risdiction . 
Tradit ional ly attorneys from either s ide could use them to e l im­
inate p rospective ju rors from the venire pool without having to 
state either  cause or explanation . A peremptory chal lenge is  
therefore a mechanism to e l im inate those prospective j u ro rs 
who the attorney bel ieves, but cannot o r  is  unwi l l i ng  to p rove , 
wi l l  act less favorably than other  members of the venire to h is  
or her  cl ient .  
The peremptory chal lenge is rooted in tradit ion .  Accord ing 
to  Blackstone,  i t  was i n  use i n  England at the beginn ing of  the 
fourteenth century. As with many other  aspects of American 
legal p rocedu res , the p ractice imm ig rated to the Americas with 
Engl ish colon ists . The U nited States Supreme Court catego­
rized it to be "a necessary part of tr ial by j u ry." U nt i l  the 1 980s 
the Court a lmost routinely rejected attacks on the use of 
peremptory chal lenges even when it was obvious that peremp­
tories were used to skew the repl ication of the ethn ic qu i lt of 
American society i n  j u ries.2 
The issue of ethn icity and j u ries a rose shortly after the 
Constitution was ratified .  As in m uch of the debate on 
American race relations the issue was framed main ly i n  the 
White-Black dichotomy. Native Americans and Asian mattered 
l i tt le .  Ju ry service was tied to cit izenship ,  and few of either  
g roup attained cit izenship u nti l  relatively recently. Whi le  
Congress g ranted cit izensh ip to members of  some tribal 
g roups in the n ineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Native 
American citizensh ip  was recogn ized only in 1 924 and fu l ly set­
tled in 1 940 by the National i ty Act. Asians became e l ig ib le for 
cit izenship even later. As for African Americans,  federal law 
was ambiguous on the nature of s laves : they were both chattel 
and persons.  The Constitution and fugitive slave acts , most 
notably the orig inal Fugitive Slave Law of 1 793, mandated the 
return of escaped slaves . Without exception all states provid­
ed for trial by jury. Constitut ions of the various states d id not 
deviate m uch from the Seventh Amendment provis ion that "in 
suits of common law, where the value  in controversy shal l  
exceed twenty dol lars ,  the right of tr ia l  by jury shal l  be pre­
served . . .  n Theoretical ly, the refore , questions on ownersh ip 
of  a l leged slaves cou ld be answered by j u ries. With in  thei r 
borders f ree states tended not to recogn ize the chattel  qual ity, 
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and therefore the monetary value,  of a slave . Such states 
regarded slaves as persons before the law. For purposes of 
recovery s lave owners also emphasized the human aspect of 
al leged fugitives . As an individual a reputed fugitive slave was 
entitled to a jury trial in free states. Federal law took precedent 
on this issue however. Consistent with the Article IV Section 2 
of the Constitution , apprehended al leged slave fugitives were 
extradited or otherwise returned to the purported p lace of thei r 
escape without tria l .  
I n  the 1 830s some states enacted personal l iberty laws to 
frustrate the s lave returning procedures. Personal l iberty laws 
reversed that basic tenet of the slavery era that African 
Americans were slaves un less it was proven to the contrary. 
Not only d id they take a black person to be free un less and unti l  
it was establ ished that he or she was a slave, such statutes 
also provided for jury trials before an al leged fugitive cou ld be 
removed from the state . Most proponents of personal l iberty 
laws were not concerned with the civi l r ights and duties of 
African Americans however. Motivated primari ly by the issue 
of states rights, some advocates of personal l iberty laws 
objected to what they regarded as needless federal i ntrusion 
into prerogatives of the states though the national govern­
ment's enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act. They also 
bel ieved that the jury trial requ i rement would dissuade bounty 
hunters and other agents of slave masters . 
Motivations aside, the Supreme Court and the Congress 
undermined personal l iberty laws. In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 
1 842, whi le it affi rmed the constitutional ity both of the Fugitive 
Slave Law and personal l iberty statutes the Supreme Court 
i nval idated trial and ju ry provisions of the latter. 3 The Court 
rel ied heavi ly on Article IV Section 2 which held that: 
No person held to Service of Labor in one State, 
under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shal l ,  
i n  Consequence of any  Law or Regulation therein ,  be 
discharged from such Service or Labor, but shall be 
del ivered up on Claim of the Party to whom and 
Service or Labor may be due. 
In the Court's th inking ,  Article IV Section 2 vitiated any 
state law or  holding that conferred freedom to an al leged fugi­
t ive slave. Hence it nu l l if ied the issue of a jury trial for any pre-
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sumed fugitive. Congress reaffirmed the right to remove 
al leged fugitive slaves without trial i n  1 850 when it re-author­
ized the fugitive slave act. 
While it became embedded in the debate over slavery, the 
issue of African Americans and juries was in no means l im ited 
to practices l inked to the "pecul iar i nstitution." It should be 
remembered that federal citizenship was relatively inconse­
quential in contrast to state c itizenship on issues most l ikely to 
involve the judiciary. I n  much of the slave-free North states 
continued to make jury service a prerogative of Whites . For 
example, in 1 807, as Congress debated termination of the 
international slave trade, New Jersey, with a tradition of choos­
ing jurors from l ists of qual ified voters, adopted a new constitu­
tion with a white suffrage only requ i rement. In a more d i rect 
manner, Ohio enacted a law in 1 831  to remove the right of 
African Americans to sit on juries. And it was only on the eve 
of the Civi l War, in 1 860, that Massachusetts's social exclusion 
of African Americans as ju rors was breached . 
The question of ethnic m inorities and juries took new 
di rections i n  the aftermath of the Civi l War. With the abol ition 
of slavery, whether African Americans were equal before thei r 
respective states' laws, with the same rights , privi leges and 
obl igations as Whites , i ncluding tr ial by and service on juries, 
became an issue of presidential reconstruction.  States recon­
structed under the Lincoln-Johnson plans answered no.  
Moreover federal juries in  such states tended to be al l-white 
and it was common for them to return what m ight be termed 
anti -black and anti-Un ion decisions. In the beginning the issue 
was justice for African Americans at the hands of al l -white 
juries in the ex-confederacy. The matter soon expanded to the 
right of African Americans to serve on ju ries in state and feder­
al courts and the qual ity of justice for a l l .  The i nabi l ity of fed­
eral prosecutors to get convictions of ex-Confederates by al l ­
white ju ries was cited by African Americans, Northerners ,  and 
the i r  sympathizers as proof of the fai lure of southern justice. 
Radical Republ icans and many Northerners thought that 
African Americans should have been given ful l  access to juries 
if for no other reason than to balance the scales for the gov­
ernment. White Northerners assumed that interracial ju ries 
would provide more even-handed justice for African Americans 
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as wel l  as for Whites. Buttressed by thei r  notions of equal ity 
before the law and the unfai rness of justice in the South , 
Radical Republ icans drafted the Fou rteenth Amendment and 
enacted a host of statutes ,  including the Civi l  R ights Acts of 
1 866 and 1 875 and the Enforcement Act of 1 872 , designed to 
enhance and protect the citizenship rights of Blacks. The Civi l  
Rights Act of 1 875 made it a crim inal offense to exclude any­
one from jury service on g rounds of race . It also included the 
corrective provision that in  i nstances of discrimination in the 
selection process any party to a su it could petition to have the 
case transferred to a federal d istrict court. 
The transfer and crim inal provisions of the Civi l Rights Act 
of 1 875 had l ittle meaning from the t ime they were enacted. 
Attorneys found it difficult to prove that racial prejudice was a 
reason African Americans were omitted from juries. As 
Reconstruction waned, ex-Confederates and the i r  spi ritual 
al l ies reestabl ished white supremacy across the South: some 
did so by stealth ; others straightforwardly discrim inated against 
African Americans without fear of punishment or censure. 
Some local it ies enacted statutes that l imited the rights and priv­
i leges of African Americans. On the judicial front, the discrim i ­
natory d rive was slowed by the Supreme Court in  1 880 i n  Ex 
parte Virginia with its reversal of decisions by Virg in ia judges to 
l imit  ju ries i n  thei r cou rt rooms to white men only.4 
In Strauder v. West Virginia, also decided i n  1 880,  the High 
Court i nval idated state statutes which l im ited jury service to 
white males as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. An African American ,  Strauder was 
indicted, tried, and eventually convicted by an al l -white jury i n  
a West Virg in ia county court.  Prior to the jury's del iberation h is 
attorney protested against the exclusion of African Americans 
from the j ury. He i nvoked the transfer provision of the Civi l 
R ights Act of 1 875 and petit ioned to remove the case to a fed­
eral court. The trial court denied h is objection and the trial pro­
ceeded. The attorney renewed h is protests after the jury ren­
dered its decision.  In additional motions , he moved to quash 
the conviction and asserted that the act which l im ited jury serv­
ice to Caucasian males violated the Equal Protection Clause 
because it denied his cl ient the right of trial by a jury inclusive 
of h is racial peers as afforded to Whites. The trial and superi-
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or  state courts rejected al l  of h is motions. A d ivided U nited 
States Supreme Court concluded otherwise: it held that defen­
dants are entit led to ju ries composed of the i r  "neighbors ,  fel­
lows, associates, persons having the same legal status in  soci­
ety as . . .  " themselves. Writing for the majority, J ustice Wi l l iam 
Strong added that to deny African Americans the r ight to par­
ticipate i n  the admin istration of law b randed them as i nferior 
and contributed to i ncit ing ''that race prej udice which is an 
i mpediment to securing to ind ividuals of the [Negro] race that 
equal j ustice which the law aims to secure to al l  others."  Any 
positive potential of Strauder and its progen ies was not real­
ized unti l relatively late because a defendant had to show 
intentional discrim ination by court officials. Furthermore adher­
ing to a principle enunciated in  Smith V. Mississippi, 1 896,  the 
Court operated on the presumption that a state's action was 
constitutional and correct unless a petitioner proved other­
wise.S 
The Virgin ias were but two of the states that kept African 
Americans inel ig ib le for ju ry duty. I n  the Strauder decision the 
Court ruled that it was a clear denial of equal p rotection of the 
laws for a black defendant to stand trial before a ju ry f rom 
which al l  African Americans were excluded by state statute. 
The Court posited that "the very idea of a j u ry is a body of men 
composed of  the peers or  equals of  the person whose rights i t  
is selected or  summoned to determine . . . . " And, cogn izant 
that "prejudice often exists against particular classes within  the 
community, which sway the judgment of j u rors , "  the Court 
asked rhetorical ly: 
Is  not p rotection of l ife and l iberty against race or color 
p rej udice , a right, a legal r ight, under the constitution-
al  amendment? And how can it be maintained that 
compel l i ng  a colored man to submit to a trial for his l ife 
by a jury drawn from a panel from which the State has 
expressly excluded every man of h is race, because of 
color alone ,  however wel l  qual ified in other respects , 
is not a denial  to h im of equal legal p rotection?6 
Consistent with constitutional law, Strauder was a solution 
for a specific p roblem. Hence whi le Strauder seemingly made 
it clear that states could not use legislation to bar African 
Americans from jury service the rul ing did not address other 
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strategies contrived to produce the al l-white jury. Delaware, for 
example, al lowed local jurisdictions to select "sober and j udi­
cious" persons for ju ry service from taxpayer l ists . Under that 
system ,  black taxpayers were ostensibly qual ified for jury serv­
ice but were rarely selected for the jury pool .  In rul ing to a chal­
lenge of the continu ing exclusion of African Americans from 
juries, the Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the State's 
contention that very few of the African Americans in Delaware 
were inte l l igent, experienced, or moral enough to serve as 
ju rors.  Seeking to rectify discriminatory admin istration of 
racial ly fai r jury selection laws to achieve d iscriminatory results 
the Court extended the premise of Strauder in  Neal v 
Delaware.7 
Neal was a hol low advance however. The same day that 
it handed down the Strauder and Ex parte Virgin ia decisions 
the Court, in  Virginia v Rives, emasculated the transfer provi­
sion of the Civi l Rights Act of 1 875, rul ing that the absence of 
African Americans from a particular jury was not persuasive 
proof of i l legal state discrim ination. The Court stated clearly 
that whi le black defendants are entitled to ju ries chosen free of 
d iscrimination against members of the i r  race,  no black defen­
dant is entitled to a ju ry which contains members of h is or her 
race.a Thereafter a case could not be transferred to federal 
courts before a ju ry was impaneled . 
The causative elements in  Strauder and Rives were i ndi­
cators of the d rift toward "separate but equal ." In the re-cast­
ed i nequal ity, Southern states l im ited pol itical participation of 
African Americans through the use of comprehension tests , 
pol l taxes, and other wel l-chronicled means to purge African 
Americans from the pol itical system.  In spite of the connective 
l i nks between pol it ical participation and ju ry service the 
Supreme Court found discrim inatory pol itical statutes constitu­
tional . The segregationist drive to exclude African Americans 
from juries received heightened sanction in  1 898 with the deci­
sion in  Williams v. Mississippi i n  which the Court upheld 
M ississippi's use of gerrymandering ,  poll taxes, and subjective 
l iteracy tests to l im it or prevent the pol itical participation of 
African Americans and especial ly to prevent them from regis­
tering to vote. Then ,  having al ready placed its constitutional 
imprimatur on M ississippi 's pol itical practice, the Court held 
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that since the state's voting statutes were constitutional under 
the Fifteenth Amendment, i ts law restricting jury service to reg­
istered voters was l ikewise constitutional even if few African 
Americans met the reg istration requ i rements. Justice Ol iver 
Wendel l  Holmes seemingly expressed the Court's reasoning 
with his decision in  Giles v. Harris; he wrote that the Court 
lacked the power to protect the rights of African Americans 
when overwhelming numbers of Whites were determined to 
violate them.9 A number of Southern states fol lowed the 
M ississippi example after the Wi l l iams decision.  The end result 
was with the severe reduction of the number  of qual ified black 
registrants the potential pools of black jurors were much 
restricted since voter registration l ists were the most popular 
source of potential jurors .  
Some African Americans managed to overcome the hur­
dles designed to prevent or to l im i t  thei r pol itical participation 
and, ostensibly, therefore, some were el ig ib le for jury duty. It 
was rare, however, for many of them to be summoned for duty 
and rarer sti l l  for any of them to serve. Cou rt officials and oth­
ers with anci l lary judicial functions routinely skipped over the 
seemingly qual ified few unti l 1 935 with the decision in  Norris v. 
Alabama. 1 0 
Norris lessened the burden of proof for defendants by forc­
ing states to defend practices which had discrim inatory 
impacts . For the fi rst time the Court suggested that lower 
courts should be guided by statistics when considering objec­
tions to al leged discriminatory uses of peremptory chal lenges. 
The i nfamous "Scottsboro boys" case, Norris was an appeal by 
a black male of his conviction by an al l-white jury of raping a 
white female. I n  a partial reversal of the R ives doctrine, the 
Supreme Court held that a defendant could prove a prima facie 
case of discrimination if he or she could demonstrate (a) the 
existence of a substantial number of his or her cognizable 
group in  the community and (b) its total exclusion from jury 
service . Upon a defendant demonstrating those ''facts , '' the 
burden of proof shifted to the state to prove that the exclusion 
was not a product of discrim ination . The Court noted that gen­
eral denials of un intentional discrim ination could not satisfy the 
burden of rebutta l .  
Norris was but  an opening .  As before , officials altered dis-
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criminatory practices to satisfy specific objections of the Court 
but without i ntention to institute jury equal ity. A common adjust­
ment was to add a few minorities to the identified pool and 
occasionally to jury panels. Often times minorities were added 
to general pools and removed before or during the voir dire. 
Such subterfuge did not go unchal lenged. Advocates of minor­
ity inclusion attacked the chicanery. As cases arose that 
involved token inclusion of m inorities , rather than their  total 
exclusion , the Supreme Court broadened the Norris thesis, 
fi rst, to instances of gross under-representation1 1 and, then ,  to 
cases where a substantial disparity between minority group 
members i n  the community and on the jury l ist "orig inated, at 
least in  part, at the point in the selection process where the jury 
commissioners i nvoked their subjective judgement rather than 
objective criteria." This drift culminated in  1 977 with the rul ing 
i n  Castaneda v. Partida, a decision that held a prima facie proof 
of discrim ination was establ ished by a demonstration of pro­
longed under representation from a cognizable group. 1 2 
The Court had not become tolerant of proportional repre­
sentation however: far from it. I n  1 965 in Swain v. Alabama it 
considered the use of the peremptory challenge for discrimina­
tory purposes for the fi rst time. Swain represented sti l l  anoth­
er appeal of a black male convicted by an al l -white jury of the 
rape of a white female .  No black person had served on a petit 
jury in Tal ladega County, where the trial was held, in the fifteen 
years before 1 965 although twenty-SiX percent of those qual i­
f ied for jury service were black. I n  the voir dire, the prosecutor 
used his peremptory chal lenges to e l iminate all six African 
Americans on the venire. On appeal the Supreme Court was 
asked whether the Equal Protection Clause prevented the total 
exclusion of African Americans from a petit jury. Counsel for 
Swain argued that this was not a singular case of uti l iz ing 
peremptories i n  a racial ly discrim inatory fashion . Although it 
agreed with defense counsel that no African American had sat 
on any type of jury in the county in modern times, the Court, 
noted that i n  several cases the defense had agreed with the 
prosecution not to i nclude African Americans in  juries, held that 
Swain's attorney had not proven that the state alone was at 
fault  for the discrim inatory resu lts . The Court observed that a 
Fourteenth Amendment issue would be raised if the defendant 
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could prove that regardless of the charge or the parties to the 
crime Tal ladega County prosecutors used their chal lenges sys­
tematical ly to e l iminate all African Americans on venires from 
duty on juries. However, the action was not unconstitutional i f  
the state l imited its exclusion of black veni remen to cases with 
b lack defendants "for the question a prosecutor or defense 
counsel must decide is not whether a juror of a particular race 
or national ity is in fact partia l ,  but whether one from a different 
group is less l ikely to be." 
Holding that the defendant had fai led to prove that the 
prosecution used its peremptory challenges to deliberately 
exclude African Americans from the jury, the Court declared 
that the "presumption in any particular case must be that the 
prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a fai r  and 
impartial jury . . . .  The presumption is not overcome [even if] 
all Negroes were removed because they were Negroes ." To 
overcome the presumption , the Court ruled, a defendant had to 
demonstrate that the state fol lowed a consistent pattern of d is­
crimination in "case after case, whatever the ci rcumstances , 
whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or vict im." 
Moreover, the defendant had to d ifferentiate between the 
defense's and prosecution's peremptory challenges in order to 
establ ish a discriminatory motive . 1 3  No defendant was able to 
meet the standards of systematic exclusion establ ished in the 
decision . Moreover, state and federal courts al ike did not 
countenance presentation of evidence from only cases which 
involved black defendants. 1 4  
Swain represented a judicial use of tradition. As early as 
1 883, in Bush v. Kentucky, the Court had ruled that the 
Constitution does not require that a trial jury must contain 
members of the same race as a party to a suit but simply pre­
vents the state from arbitrari ly e l iminating members of her or 
his cognizable group. Bush was but one of a score of chal­
lenges to the system of peremptory challenges. The Court was 
adamant that the Constitution forbids the systematic exclusion 
of members of cognizable groups from jury panels without 
requiring inclusion of representation from groups in such bod­
ies. The Court restated its position in Apodaca v. Oregon in 
which it held that no defendant had the right to "challenge the 
makeup of a jury merely because no members of his race are 
1 1 4  
Welch-Jury System 
on the jury" for there is no constitutional requirement that every 
particular jury be representative . 1 5 Thus, whi le the Court 
accepted, for a time in  Akins v. Texas, 1 6  the practice of the Jury 
Commissioner of Dal las County of never including more than a 
single African American in grand juries as a "good faith effort" 
in compl iance with the rul ing, in Hill v. Texas, 17 it eventually 
found the practice odious and unacceptable. According to 
Associate Justice Frank Murphy, the Equal Protection Clause 
guarantees "not only the right to have Negroes considered as 
prospective ven i remen but also the right to have them consid­
ered without numerical or proportional l imitation." As stated in 
Cassell v. Texas, it is unconstitutional to i nclude a predeter­
mined number of any cognizable group, even that to which a 
minority defendant belongs, for jurors "should be selected as 
individuals , on the basis of individual qual ifications, and not as 
members of a race."1 8  
While sti l l  reluctant to consider the use of peremptory chal­
lenges the Court addressed the notion of group affi l iation more 
di rectly in 1 954 in Hernandez v. Texas. Texas had continued 
to rely on the key-man system to select juries; community lead­
ers provided jury commissioners with names for jury l ists . Most 
key-men were White as were most of their identified prospects. 
M inorities especially persons of Mexican heritage were severe­
ly under represented in jury l ists . I n  Hernandez the Court 
accepted the assertion that Mexican-Americans constituted a 
cognizable class. It then proceeded to rule that an administra­
tion of jury selection procedures so as to exclude Mexican­
Americans or to min imize their participation was as much a vio­
lation of equal protection as if it had been done against African­
Americans. I n  the words of the Court: 
When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrat­
ed, and it is further shown that the laws, as written or 
as appl ied, single out that class for different treatment 
not based on some reasonable classification, the 
guarantees of the Constitution have been violated. 
The Fourteenth Amendment is not d irected solely 
against discrim ination due to a two-class theory-that 
is ,  based upon d ifferences between white and 
Negro. 1 9 
The Court also dealt with other procedural questions with 
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bearing on juries and minorities. The right to invoke cause is 
premised on the real ization that i ndividuals hold prejudices that 
might h inder thei r abi l ity to be fai r  and impartial . Prejudice can 
be ethnic and racia l .  Whi le it does not guarantee perfection , 
the voir dire is an opportune process to d iscover any prejudice 
that might affect a juror's impartial ity. Rules of judicial behav­
ior restrict the questions which attorneys and judges m ight ask 
potential jurors however. Nevertheless in People v. Reyes,20 
with Mexican nationals as defendants , in People v. Car Soy 
which involved Chinese ,21  Horst v. Silverman,22 a case in  which 
Jews were parties, and Aldridge v. United States, an appeal by 
an African American,23 the Court declared that there are spe­
cial conditions when the "essential demands of fai rness" com­
mand that ven i remen be questioned about racial or ethnic prej­
udices. I n  a series of later decisions, the Court del ineated the 
very l imited circumstances when voir dire questioning to dis­
cern such biases is perm issible.24 
The High Court also held that i l legal discrimination in  con­
stituting of either the grand or the petit jury mandates reversal 
of any result ing conviction25. Then going further, and casting 
aside technical ities , the Court in  Turner v. Fouche26 and in 
Carter v. Jury CommissioJ127 accepted the right of black citizens 
not d i rectly involved in a specific exclusion case to challenge 
the systematic exclusion of African Americans from petit and 
grand juries. According to the Carter majority "Whether jury 
service be deemed a right, a privi lege, or a duty, the State may 
no more extend it to some of i ts citizens and deny it to others 
on racial g rounds than it may invidiously discrim inate in  the 
offering and withholding of the elective franchise." 
The decision in  Peters v. Kiff extended that rationale to 
Whites . I n  Peters, a white male defendant protested against 
the systematic exclusion of African Americans from the grand 
and petit ju ries which, respectively, indicted and tried and con­
victed h im .  Before his appeal could be considered on its mer­
its , the question of whether white persons had standing to raise 
the issue of systematic exclusion of African Americans had to 
be decided. A divided Court said they did. Writing for the 
majority, Justice Thurgood Marshal l held that: 
When any large and identifiable segment of the com­
munity is excluded from jury service, the effect is to 
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remove from the jury room qual ities of human nature 
and varieties of human experience, the range of which 
is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not neces­
sary to assume that the excluded group wi l l  consis­
tently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, 
that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on 
human events that may have unsuspected impor­
tance in  any case that may be presented .28 
President Lyndon B. Johnson echoed Marshal l's position 
in his cal l  for the Civi l Rights Act of 1 966. The Civil Rights Act 
of 1 966 was motivated in part by a desi re to el iminate discrim­
inatory practices condoned by the Swain decision . The imme­
diate inspiration behind the b i l l ,  however, was the acquittal of 
several white defendants charged with crimes against African 
Americans and civi l rights workers by al l-white juries. In rec­
ommending corrective action to Congress , President Johnson 
evoked paral lels of the Reconstruction era's notion of commu­
n ity and community service, with the assertion that to deny 
. . .  jury service to any group deprives it of one of the 
oldest and most precious privileges and duties of free 
men. It is not only the excluded group which suffers. 
Courts are denied the justice that flows from impartial 
juries selected from a cross section of the community. 
The people's confidence in justice is eroded.29 
Title I deals with federal juries. I t  prohibits discrimination on 
account of color, race , rel ig ion,  gender, economic status , or 
national origin .  I ts i n itial section reaffi rms that "al l  l it igants in 
Federal Courts entitled to trial by jury shal l have the right to a 
jury selected from a cross section of the community in  the dis­
trict or d ivision where the court convenes . . . .  " I t  declares that 
"al l qual ified citizens shal l  have the opportunity to serve on 
grand and petit ju ries" in  federal courts and "shal l  have an obli­
gation to serve when summoned." It also establ ished proce­
dures for the selection of ju rors.  
Title I I  a ims to e l im inate discrim ination i n  state and local 
ju ries primarily through judicial , rather than admin istrative , 
means. Section 201 holds that 
it shal l  be un lawfu l  to make any d istinction on account 
of race, color, rel ig ion,  sex, national orig in or econom­
ic status in the qual ifications for service, and in  the 
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selection , of any person to serve on grand or petit 
juries in any state. 
The Act commissions the Attorney General to sue in federal 
court 
whenever there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that any person has engaged or is about to engage in 
any act or practice which would deny or abridge" any 
of the guarantees of Section 20 1 ." I f  it determined 
there were violations of the Act's jury provisions the 
court can force state officials to use "objective criteria" 
in formulating jury I ists .30 
A number of states also moved to end the systematic 
abuse of the right to a jury of one's peers.  Cal ifornia led the 
way. ln People v. Wheeler the California Supreme Court ruled 
that the use of peremptory chal lenges to disqual ify prospective 
jurors simply on grounds of g roup affi l iation violated Article I 
Section 1 6  of the Cal ifornia Constitution .31 The Cal ifornia opin­
ion also rested on Taylor v. Louisiana,32 a judgment by the 
United States Supreme Court that one's peers required trial 
juries and not merely venires to have a cross section of the 
population . The Cal ifornia jurists went further and added that 
a petit ju ry should reflect as ideally a cross section of the com­
munity as random selection would produce. Like the U .S .  
Supreme Court in Swain ,  the Cal ifornia court formulated stan­
dards to establ ish a prima facie condition to assert the use of 
peremptories in an ethnical ly b iased manner. Either the 
defense or the prosecution can object to a seemingly discrimi­
natory use of peremptories and neither s ide has to be a mem­
ber of the cognizable group it claimed was i l legally excluded. 
Massachusetts and New Mexico fol lowed suit i n  
Commonwealth v. Soares33 and State v. Crespif134 respective­
ly. The Massachusetts court held peremptories could not be 
used in a fashion so as to make meaningless the state consti­
tutional guarantee of a petit jury of one's peers or to infringe 
upon the state's Equal Rights Amendment which prohibits any 
abridging of equal ity on the basis of color, creed, gender, race, 
or national origin .  
Wheeler, Soares, and s imi lar decisions withstood attacks 
of the i r  constitutional ity in federal courts because they rested 
on thei r states' constitution and not on federal statutes. 
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Though it continued to adhere to Swain the Supreme Court 
was not unalterably opposed to reconsidering its position . In  
the interim and over the repeated objections of  justices Wi l l iam 
Brennan and Marshal l ,  it waited to "al low the various states to 
serve as laboratories in  which the issue receives further study 
before it is addressed by this Court" again .  Joined by Brennan , 
Marshall attacked the majority's "experimentation with the 
rights ,  and l ives of petitioners"; in his dissent in Gilliard v 
Mississippi he wrote: 
When a majority of this Court suspects that such 
rights are being regularly abridged, the Court shrinks 
from its constitutional duty by awaiting developments 
in state or other federal courts. Because abuse of 
peremptory chal lenges appears to be most prevalent 
in capital cases, the need for immediate review in  this 
Court is al l  the more urgent. If we postpone consid­
eration of the issue much longer, petitioners in this 
and sim i lar cases wi l l  be put to death before their  con­
stitutional rights can be vindicated. Under the circum­
stances , I do not understand how in  good conscience 
we can await further developments, regardless of how 
helpful those developments might be to our own 
del iberations.35 
Marshal l also chided his brethren that 
there is no point in taking elaborate steps to ensure 
Negroes are included in venires simply so they can be 
struck because of their race by a prosecutor's use of 
peremptory chal lenges."36 
The delayed reconsideration came in Batson v. Kentucky, 
a radical ru l ing on peremptories. For the fi rst time, a federal 
court agreed that an attorney can be forced to explain his or 
her reason for invoking a peremptory. It  provided release from 
the untenable s ituation created by Swain. The issue was 
framed starkly in the "Question Presented" to the Court by 
Batson's counsel on appeal : 
I n  a criminal case, does a state trial court err when, 
over the objection of a black defendant, it swears an 
al l -white jury constituted only after the prosecutor had 
exercised four  of his six peremptory chal lenges to 
strike all of the black ven i remen from the panel in  vio-
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lation of constitutional provisions guaranteeing the 
defendant an impartial jury and a jury composed of 
persons representing a fai r  cross section of the com­
munity? 
The "Question" encapsulated the facts . James Ki rkland 
Batson had been charged with burglary and the receipt of 
stolen goods. At the end of the voir dire the prosecutor, Mr. 
Gutman, used four  of h is six peremptories to create, in h is 
words, an "al l -white jury." Defense counsel , M r. Douglas 
Dowel l ,  moved for dismissal of the panel before it was sworn 
on grounds that the panel did not represent a cross-section of 
the community and to use it would be a denial of equal protec­
tion . The judge denied the motion to discharge the ju ry. 
Batson was tried and duly convicted. The Kentucky Supreme 
Court upheld the conviction , in 1 984, holding that it had 
"recently reaffirmed [its] rel iance on Swain" and because 
Batson had not shown "systematic exclusion from the jury" he 
did not have a claim under Swain .37 The Supreme Court dis­
agreed. I t  reversed Batson's conviction holding that the impan­
el ing of the jury resulted in  a denial of equal protection. In rUl­
ing that when an objection is lodged against an al leged racial ­
ly discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge the trial court 
must examine the val idity of the claim,  the United Supreme 
Court continued the i ncremental reform to make the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of trial by a cross-section of the com­
munity meaningful for a l l .  I n  so doing the Court not only 
reversed Swain but also m ight have opened a new Pandora's 
box, creating a second category of peremptory challenges. 
Notes 
1 P.L. Murphy, The Constitution in Crisis Time, 1 9 1 9- 1 969. 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1 972) , p .  4 1 3. 
2 Batson v. Kentucky, 84 SC 733 ( 1 985) ; See also McCray v 
New York, 461 U.S .  970 ( 1 983) . 
3 Prigg v. Pennsylvania. 
4 Ex parte Virg inia, 1 00 U .S .  339 ( 1 880) . 
1 20 
Welch�u ry System 
5 Smith v. M ississippi , 1 62 U .S .  592 ( 1 896) . 
6 Strauder v West Vi rg in ia, 1 00 U .S .  303 ( 1 880) 
7 Neal v. Delaware , 1 03 U .S .  370 ( 1 881 ) .  
8 Virgin ia v. Rives, 1 00 U .S .  3 1 3 ( 1 880) 
9 Gi les v. Harris, 1 89 U .S. 475 ( 1 903) . 
10 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U .S .  587 ( 1 935) .  
1 1  Avery v. Georgia,  345 U .S. 559 ( 1 953) . 
1 2 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U .S .  482 ( 1 977) . 
1 3 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U .S .  202 ( 1 965) . 
1 4  McCray v. New York, U .S .  1 03 S .  Ct. 2438 ( 1 983) . G i l l iard 
v. M ississippi , 1 04 S .  Ct. 340 ( 1 983) . M i l ler  v. I l l i nois and Perry 
v. I l l i nois 561  U .S .  961  ( 1 983) Thompson v. U nited States, 1 05 
S .  Ct. 443 ( 1 984) . 
1 5 Apodaca v. Oregon,  406 U .S .  404 ( 1 972) .  
1 6 Akins v.  Texas , 325 U .S.  398 ( 1 945) . 
1 7 Hi l l  v. Texas, 3 1 6 U .S .  400 ( 1 942) . 
18 Cassel l  v. Texas, 339 U .S .  282 ( 1 950) . See also Thiel v. 
Southern Pacific Co. , 328 U .S .  2 1 7 ( 1 946) i n  which the Court 
wrote "ju ry  competence is an i ndividual rather than a g roup or 
class matter. That fact l ies at the very heart of the jury system .  
To disregard i t  i s  to open the door to class distinctions and dis­
crim inations." 
1 9 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U .S .  475 ( 1 954) . 
20 People v. Reyes, 9 Cal .  347 ( 1 855) . 
21 People v. Car Soy, 57 Cal . 1 02 ( 1 880) . 
1 2 1 
Ethnic Studies Review Volume 24 
22 Horst v. Si lverman, 20 Washington 233, 55 P. 52 ( 1 898) . 
23 Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S.  ( 1 93 1 ) .  
24 See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S.  589 ( 1 976) ; Rosales-Lopez 
v. United States, 451 U.S.  1 82 ( 1 98 1 ) ;  United Bear Runner, 
502 F. 2d 908 (8th Cir. 1 974) ; United States v. Diggs, 429 U .S. 
852 ( 1 976) ; and United States v. Walker, 4 1 6 U.S .  1 994 ( 1 974) . 
25 Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S.3 354 ( 1 939) . 
26 Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S.  346 ( 1 970) . 
27 Carter v. Jury Commission , 396 U.S.  320 ( 1 970) . 
28 Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S.  503 ( 1 972) . Also see Powers v. Ohio, 
1 1 1  S. Ct. ( 1 99 1 ) .  
29 Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 5 o f  the House 
Committee on the Judiciary on Miscellaneous Proposals 
Regarding the Civil Rights of Persons Within the Jurisdiction of 
the United States, 89th Congress 2nd Session , Series 1 6  
( 1 966) 1 048. 
30 H.R. 1 4765 S 1 0 1 - 1 86, S 201 , S 203(b) . 
31 People v. Wheeler, 22 Calif. 3d 1 48 Californ ia Reporter 903. 
32 Taylor v. Louisiana, 4 1 9 U.S.  522 ( 1 975) . 
33 Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 46 1 and 3444 U.S.  
881 ( 1 979) . 
34 State v. Crespin ,  94 N .M.  486, 6 1 2 P. 71 6 (N .M.  Ct. App. 
1 980) . 
35 Gil l iard v. Mississippi, 1 04 S Ct. 40 ( 1 983) 
36 McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 970 ( 1 983) . 
37 Batson v Kentucky, 84SC 733-MR. 
1 22 
